His research interests focus on comparative public opinion and parties in advanced indus- trial democracies. Petersburg, Russia. He is also past president of the World Values Survey Association. His research focuses on human empowerment, emancipative values, cultural change, and democratization. Author of some hundred scholarly publications, his most recent books include Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation — winner of the Alexander L.
In a sense, this book began when Ronald Inglehart went to Paris in May to investigate the causes of a student uprising that had just paralyzed France. He mounted a representative national survey of the French public that probed into the motivations underlying the greatest mass uprising since World War II and why the Gaullist government that had opposed it was returned to power by a majority of French voters in subsequent national elections.
When he began to analyze the results, Inglehart was surprised: the data contradicted his expectations. Like most observers — including the strikers and demonstrators themselves — he assumed that the May uprising was a man- ifestation of class conflict. Paris was covered with posters attacking capitalist exploitation; French intellectuals interpreted the events in Marxist terms, and the participants used standard Marxist slogans about class struggle. Accord- ingly, Inglehart initially struggled to make the findings fit Marxist expectations. New elections were held a month after the strikes and demonstrations.
His data showed that instead of heightened class polarization, with the proletariat sup- porting the parties of the Left and the bourgeoisie rallying behind General de Gaulle, a large share of the working-class voters had shifted to support the Gaullist ruling party, contributing to its victory. It was mainly middle-class voters who moved in the opposite direction. Seeking to understand why this happened, Inglehart analyzed the responses to an open-ended question that asked about the goals of those who had taken part in the strikes and demonstrations.
The motivations varied sharply by age and social class. Working-class respondents, especially the older ones, over- whelmingly mentioned higher salaries. Middle-class respondents, especially the younger ones, said they wanted a freer, less impersonal society. Inglehart hypothesized that these age and class differences reflected a process of inter- generational value change linked with the economic miracles of the postwar era. He reasoned that, throughout history, most people have grown up experi- encing economic and physical insecurity. In Germany, the older generations had experienced deprivation and loss of life during World War I, followed by the Great Depression of the s, and then defeat, occupation, and liberation during World War II.
The postwar era, by contrast, brought historically unprecedented levels of economic and physical security. During the two decades before , Germany experienced the high- est economic growth rates in its history. This economic development, combined with the emergence of the modern welfare state, meant that for the first time in history, a large part of the population had grown up in a society where starva- tion was virtually unknown. A large part of the postwar generation no longer gave top priority to economic security, instead placing growing emphasis on autonomy and freedom of expression.
The student protesters in France, Germany, and elsewhere in the Western world indicated the political emergence of the postwar generation. Although their formative conditions had been present for years, this generation did not become old enough to have an impact on politics until the s, when they were university students. Eventually they would occupy the leading positions in society, but initially they saw themselves as having values that were sharply different from those of their elders.
When postmaterialists first emerged as a political force, they tended to express themselves in Marxist slogans, which were then the standard rhetoric of protest in Western Europe. But in fact there were profound differences between the goals of the postmaterialists and those of the Marxist Left, as the postmaterialists gradually discovered.
In , Inglehart tested his postmaterialist value change theory in a six- nation survey of European attitudes with a battery of questions he had explic- itly designed to measure materialist versus postmaterialist values.
In all six countries Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Nether- lands , there were massive differences between the values of young and old respondents. Among those older than sixty-five, materialists outnumbered post- materialists by a margin of fourteen to one; but among the postwar generation, postmaterialists were more numerous than materialists. Moreover, within each birth cohort, postmaterialists were much more heavily represented among the economically secure strata than among the less-educated and lower-income groups.
American Political Science Review, and the concept of postmaterialism entered the vocabulary of modern political science. Data from a long time series would be needed to answer this question. The four-item materialist- postmaterialist values battery was included in the Eurobarometer surveys beginning in and was continued for decades. This made it possible to carry out cohort analyses based on data covering a long time series. The results confirmed that a process of intergenerational value change was taking place: given birth cohorts did not become more materialist as they grew older, and as younger cohorts gradually replaced older ones in the adult population, the society as a whole became increasingly postmaterialist.
In addition, the wealth of the data in the Eurobarometer studies enabled survey researchers to exam- ine the range of attitudes and behaviors linked to postmaterialist value change, stimulating a growing body of research on this topic. The research agenda on value change in contemporary societies continued to expand. In , Inglehart developed a broader-based twelve-item battery. With Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase, Warren Miller, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and Alan Marsh, he helped design the Political Action study, which demonstrated the link between value change and new forms of political action such as protests, petitions, sit-ins, and various other manifestations of contentious action.
But in subsequent research, Inglehart found that the value shift he first measured in was part of a much broader process of intergenerational cultural change linked with modernization. Self- expression values give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of out-groups, gender equality, and emphasis on participation in decision making in economic and political life. These values reflect mass polarization over gender equality and individual freedoms, which are part of a broader syndrome of tolerance of out-groups, including foreigners and gays and lesbians.
The shift. Barnes, M. Kaase, K. Allerbeck, F. Heunks, R. Inglehart, M. Jennings, et al. Abramson and R. Inglehart and W. Plus it goes with a rising sense of subjective well-being that is conducive to tolerance, trust, political moderation, and expressive political action — all of which are conducive to democracy. Building on this revised view of modernization, Inglehart, in collaboration with various colleagues, particularly Christian Welzel and Pippa Norris, devel- oped the evolutionary modernization theory.
Departing from earlier versions of modernization theory, it abandons simplistic assumptions of linearity. Nevertheless, it seems clear that rising economic and physical security tends to erode the rigid cultural norms that characterized agrarian societies, leading to norms that allow greater individual autonomy and free choice. Strikingly similar findings have been reported by researchers in other disciplines from anthropology to biology. Thus, Gelfand and colleagues find that nations that encountered severe ecological and historical threats have stronger norms and lower tolerance of deviant behavior than do other nations, arguing that exis- tential pressures determine whether a culture is tolerant of deviance.
Inglehart and P. Norris and R. Inglehart and C. Gelfand, J. Raver, L. Nishii, L. Leslie, J. Lun, B. Lim, et al. Thornhill, C. Fincher, and D. Foreword xxiii. The underlying logic connecting this lineage of theories is that increasing existential security, cog- nitive mobilization, and other opportunity-widening aspects of modernization tend to make people more self-directed and to shift their emphasis on freedom of choice and equality of opportunities. These values fuel various social move- ment activities that advocate gender equality, tolerance of gays and lesbians, and participatory democracy throughout societal life.
Rabier is one of the unsung heroes of cross-national survey research. He not only launched the Eurobarometer surveys but also inspired and supported other cross-national survey research programs such as the Latino Barometer, the Afro Barometer, and the East Asia Barometer. He also helped design the European Values Study, launched in by Jan Kerkhofs and Ruud de Moore, which was carried out by the same survey institutes that did the Eurobarometer and included many of its key indicators, such as materialist-postmaterialist values and unconventional political action measures from the Political Action Surveys.
In , Inglehart launched a new wave of the WVS on his own, and in , the EVS and WVS were established as two separate groups, which continue to cooperate, sharing key batteries of items to build up an unprecedented time series for the analysis of value change. These people, from countries. A project of this scope requires people with diverse talents to design, organize, fund, analyze, archive, interpret, and publish findings from this study of social change in more than countries, extending over 30 years. The WVS is diverse not only in talented people but also geographically.
The WVS secretariat is based in Stockholm, the archiving is carried out in Madrid, and analysis and interpretation of the data are pursued by thousands of researchers in scores of countries around the world. In codesigning the WVS, Inglehart emphasized a strategy of diversity, trying to cover the widest possible range of societies. This was a deliberate strategic choice. He was aware that a more cautious approach would have been to limit the data collection to countries with well-developed survey infrastructures, ensuring that fieldwork was carried out by experienced survey institutions.
He was convinced that it was a better overall strategy to push the envelope, maximizing the economic, political, and cultural diversity of the countries covered. This approach greatly increases the analytic leverage that is available for analyzing the role of culture, economic development, and democratic versus authoritarian institutions. But it also tends to increase the possible error in measurement.
This is a difficult balancing act, and it is an empirical question whether the gains offset the potential costs. Extending survey research into developing countries means doing it in places where the infrastructure is less developed and the margin of error is likely to be higher. This raises the question: Is it possible to obtain accurate measures of mass beliefs and values in low-income countries and authoritarian states where survey research is rare?
Or is the error margin so large as to render the data useless for comparative analysis? There is no a priori answer to this question; it requires empirical testing. Inglehart and Welzel conducted some relevant tests. Thus, they compared the strength of the correlations obtained from high-income societies with the strength of those obtained from all available societies. Here two effects work against each other: 1 the presumed loss of data quality that comes from including lower-income societies, which would tend to weaken the correlations; and 2 the increased analytical leverage that comes from including the full range of societies, which should strengthen the correlations.
Which effect is stronger? They found that among high-income societies, the average correlation between self-expression values and ten widely used economic development indicators was 0. The data from all. Foreword xxv. Their theory also implies that one should find strong linkages between self-expression values, the emergence of civil society, and the flourishing of democratic institutions. Another important reason for covering the whole spectrum of economic and democratic development is that bringing survey research into these societies helps them develop their research capabilities.
Survey research can provide valuable feedback for policy makers, and the WVS network is based on the belief that it is the responsibility of social scientists in developed societies to help disseminate survey research techniques. Accordingly, the WVS has produced many publications based on collaboration between social scientists in developing countries and colleagues from countries with a long experience in using survey research. Inglehart was convinced that, over time, the quality of fieldwork in developing countries would be improved, and he considered the effort to do so worth a substantial investment.
For academics, life regenerates itself through students and colleagues. Ingle- hart takes tremendous pride in the students and colleagues with whom he has worked — some of whom have contributed to this volume. I express my deep gratitude to all the authors for producing this volume. Preface and Acknowledgments. Sometime in the —70s, the paradigm of comparative politics began to change in the established democracies. The landmark study, The Civic Cul- ture, thus looked at postwar Europe and before to assess what type of political culture sustained democracy.
But societies and their people change. Mass prosperity, education, infor- mation, and other forces of social modernization were transforming citizens and the democratic process. Usually, scholars and pundits depicted these developments as threats to democracy, often hearkening back to the model of citizenry proposed in the political culture studies of the early postwar era.
One of the first scholars to recognize the erosion of the allegiant model of democratic citizenship was Ronald Inglehart. In his landmark work, The Silent Revolution, Ronald Inglehart theorized and demonstrated the motivation driving the rise of elite-challenging action — a growing eman- cipatory spirit visible in increasing postmaterialist values.
He further identi- fied the generational increase of existential security and cognitive mobilization as the social forces fueling the rise of these new values. With this theory, Inglehart enriched the political culture field with a set of ideas and concepts that greatly enhanced our understanding of cultural change. At the beginning of his career, the field of comparative political culture research had systematic data for no more than a handful of countries. Inspired by the ambition to improve this situation, Inglehart helped develop the Euro- barometer surveys, contributed to the European Values Study, and founded the World Values Survey — the most encompassing, most widely cited and used, and most widely recognized database for studying political culture and cul- tural change.
Hence Inglehart invented not only some of the most influential concepts but he also created the infrastructure for a major field of compar- ative politics. The development of these surveys has enabled a generation of scholars to do research in areas where no one had gone before.
Both his intel- lectual and data collection contributions are so exceptional and outstanding that we dedicate this book as a tribute to the lifetime achievements of Ronald Inglehart. In developing this project, we received essential support from the Alexan- der von Humboldt Stiftung. The foundation provided a Transcoop grant for collaboration between Welzel and Dalton and their respective universities. We appre- ciate the financial and administrative support from both centers, especially the center directors Ferdinand Muller-Rommel and William Schonfold.
Along the way, many people have assisted in developing this book. Bjoern Buss produced the index. Lewis Bateman, the chief social science editor at Cambridge University Press, and his assistant, Shaun Vigil, provided helpful guidance in getting this book ready for publication. The seed for this project was probably sown in previous collaborations with Almond and Verba that shaped our thinking about political culture, culture change, and the value of individual citizens.
We stand on their shoulders, and we hope they would view this positively. It created the foundation for political culture research on which we build. Our argument is that the tenor of this voice has changed in the past half-century, with significant consequences for contemporary politics. We owe a debt to Almond and Verba for launching a research program with the enduring importance that led to the themes we study here.
The importance of these two classic studies cannot be overemphasized.
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They widened the political cul- ture approach into a global framework for the comparative analysis of political change and regime legitimacy in developed as well as developing countries. The guiding question of the Almond-Verba-Pye approach concerned what citizen beliefs make democratic regimes survive and flourish. With the expansion of democracy into new regions of the globe, this civicness question is even more relevant today. Political Culture and Political Development laid out the analytical tool kit and categories to examine the civicness question empirically.
The volume was particularly important on conceptual grounds, yet it lacked systematic cross- national data to support its conclusions because such research was not feasi- ble. Today, this situation has changed dramatically. The World Values Survey WVS and other cross-national projects have opened large parts of the develop- ing world to public opinion research. Now there is an abundance of evidence on a wide range of social and political attitudes.
This situation creates an excellent opportunity to evaluate contemporary political cultures in terms of the civicness question. Verba and his colleagues stressed a cluster of orientations that supposedly support a democratic polity: allegiance to the regime, pride in the political sys- tem, and modest levels of political participation. This allegiant model was most apparent in the United States and Britain, the two mature and stable democ- racies in their study — and lacking in other democratizing nations. However, the modern wave of comparative research in political culture offers a different answer to the question of what citizen beliefs are congruent with democracy.
This research argued that contemporary publics are developing more assertive, self-expressive values that contrast with the allegiant values of the Civic Culture model, thus changing the nature of democratic citizenship. Instead of an allegiant and loyal public, estab- lished democracies now have a public of critical citizens Klingemann ; Norris ; Dalton People power movements from the Philip- pines to communist Eastern Europe to sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate a popular desire for political change that appears inconsistent with the Civic Culture model.
The Economist recognized this development when it described why Egyptians protested for political reform against the various authoritarian regimes they confronted, from the Mubarak regime to the generals controlling the government in late This is that ordinary people yearn for dignity. They hate being bossed around by petty officials and ruled by corrupt autocrats. They reject the apparatus of a police state. Instead they want better lives, decent jobs and some basic freedoms. These insights produce a far different image of the average person in a develop- ing nation than what was proposed in Political Culture and Political Develop- ment.
Individuals in these societies do not embrace or accept the authoritarian states in which they live, but rather hold unfulfilled aspirations for a better way of life. Expanding empirical research on developing nations — both democratic and nondemocratic — often finds that citizen values are a poor match to the pat- terns presented in the early political culture and political development litera- ture Inglehart and Welzel ; Dalton and Shin ; Bratton et al.
Many of these publics are politically interested with strong democratic aspirations. In short, some of the stark contrasts the civic culture model posited between developing nations and established democracies seem no longer valid. The Civic Culture maintained that allegiant orientations char- acterize stable democracies and that these orientations need to mature in the developing nations, too, if they ought to become stable democracies as well. Today, however, assertive orientations characterize established democracies, with some evidence that they are also emerging in the developing world.
See, for example, Flanagan and Lee , Schwarz , and Abramson Political Culture and Value Change 3. This book is dedicated to a twofold task: analyzing cross-national survey data in light of the initial Almond-Verba-Pye framework and reevaluating the original civic culture model against more recent empirical evidence.
To accomplish this task, the contributors to this book use evidence from the WVS. This is an unparalleled resource that allows us to analyze public opinions toward government and democracy, citizen values, and the potential impact of changing values on contemporary societies. In the parlance of Hollywood filmmaking, we are not sure if this book represents a remake of the early Civic Culture study or a sequel to it.
However, our intent is to use the basic concepts and ideas of Almond-Verba-Pye as our starting point. Then we reevaluate this theory — and more recent developments in political culture theory — based on the new evidence of the WVS. The results, we believe, shed new light on how global values have been changing and the implications for contemporary political systems. Almond and Verba , Although the Civic Culture framework is well known, it is worthwhile to summarize the key elements on which we build.
First, they used a Parsonian approach to distinguish between different types of attitudes: 1 cognitive orientations involve knowledge and beliefs about politics; 2 affective orientations are positive or negative feelings toward polit- ical objects; and 3 evaluative orientations involve judgments about political options and processes. Second, they identified four different classes of political objects toward which citizen attitudes are directed: 1 the political system in general; 2 input objects, such as political parties, interest groups, or political actors engaged in conveying demands from the citizenry to institutions; 3 output objects, such as government bureaucracies or agents of state authority that implement public policies; and 4 orientations toward the self and others in terms of role models of what the ideal citizen should do.
Combining these two dimensions, Almond and Verba identified three ideal types of political culture. The parochial culture exists when individuals are essentially apolitical. The subject culture is one in which individuals are aware of the state and its policy outputs but lack significant orientations toward input objects and toward the individual as an active participant. The subject is aware of politics but only involved as a recipient of orders and an object of mobilization. In the participant culture, people hold orientations toward all four classes of political objects.
They are aware of government, the processes of political input, and the outputs of government, and they adopt an activist view of their role as citizens. People know and appreciate that they can express their preferences through interest organizations and political parties, by casting votes for their preferred candidates, or through other political activities. Almond and Verba portrayed the civic culture that is most conducive to democracy as a mixture of the subject and the participant orientations. In a civic culture, citizens strictly abide the law and respect legitimate political authority.
Even as participant citizens, they are aware of their limited role in representative democracies, which focuses on electing representatives within organizations or public office holders. Almond and Verba stressed that the parochial, subject, and participant cul- tures are ideal-typical models, which do not exist in pure form in any society.
But they maintained that elements of the three models exist in significantly dif- ferent proportions in the world of their time. Other scholarship from this period reinforced this basic theoretical frame- work. For example, Pye and Verba described the cultural impediments to democracy in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Turkey in terms that evoked the concepts of parochial and subject cultures — and a lack of a participant culture. Accordingly, democracy required socioeco- nomic modernization to transform a society and its culture in a democracy- compatible fashion also see Almond and Coleman ; Inkeles , ; Inkeles and Smith This research posited a strong relationship between socioeconomic development and the development of a democratic civic culture.
For instance, a parochial political culture should be predominant in traditional peasant soci- eties that have little contact with a national or regional government. A society that is partly traditional and partly modern, typical of many developing nations, presumably has a mixed parochial-subject culture. Most people in such systems are presumably passive subjects, aware of government, complying with the law, but not otherwise involved in public affairs.
The parochials — poor and illit- erate urban dwellers, peasants, or farm laborers — have limited contact with or awareness of the political system. Only a very small stratum of the public participates in the political process, and even then in highly restricted ways. At a further stage of social and political modernization, the congruent cul- ture and institutions reflect a different pattern. For instance, in industrialized authoritarian societies, such as fascist states in Western Europe or the former communist nations of Eastern Europe, most citizens are subjects.
They are encouraged and even forced to cast a symbolic vote of support in elections and to pay taxes, obey regulations, demonstrate system identification in state- managed public events, and follow the dictates of government. Because of the effectiveness of modern social organization, propaganda, and indoctrination, few people are unaware of the government and its influence on their lives; there are few parochials. At the same time, few people are involved as participants who autonomously express their authentic preferences.
It is even question- able if authentic political preferences exist: Participants in the true sense are absent not only because the system would repress them but also because the citizens have not learned the role model of a participant citizen. The Civic Culture implied that a modern industrial democracy has a majority of participants in the limited, allegiant sense , a substantial number of subjects, and a small group of parochials. This distribution presumably provided enough political activists to ensure competition between political parties and sizable voter turnout as well as attentive audiences for debate on public issues by parties, candidates, and pressure groups.
There is an interesting tension in the Almond-Verba framework. On the one hand, their framework is influenced by modernization theory and open to the idea that socioeconomic modernization changes citizen preferences and expectations. For example, they routinely examined educational differences in political attitudes with the implicit argument that social modernization would expand education and thus transform orientations in a pro-democratic direc- tion.
The postulated direction of change was to strengthen many aspects of the allegiant model of citizenship, such as various measures of political support. In addition, the framework emphasized the indoctrination powers of mod- ern authoritarian systems and their ability to reproduce a culture that is con- gruent with their authoritarian structures. This was likely a reflection of the Cold War communist experience in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as the tragic history of Europe in the mid-twentieth century Almond The Civic Culture framework thus gave less attention to how socioe- conomic modernization can give rise to democratic, participatory desires even in nondemocratic systems, accumulating an underground delegitimizing force of authoritarian rule.
Rightly or wrongly, many analysts concluded that par- ticipant orientations and other democratic orientations can really take root only under existing democratic systems Rustow ; Muller and Seligson ; Jackman and Miller ; Hadenius and Teorell This implies a primarily elite-driven model of democratization, if it occurs. In summary, two broad implications for the democratization process follow from this framework.
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First, the congruence thesis assumes that regime stability and effective government are more likely if the political culture is congruent with the regime form. Thus, one reason why autocratic governments exist is presumably because they occur in societies where the citizenry tolerates or even expects an autocratic state. Brutally rephrasing Adlai Stevenson, people get the type of government that they deserve. Moreover, if we assume that the political culture is embedded in a network of social relations, traditional norms, and socioeconomic conditions, then cultural change will occur very slowly Eckstein ; Pye Thus, the congruence thesis implies that autocratic governments endure when there is a parochial and subject culture.
Second, The Civic Culture had a constrained view of the values of the ideal democratic citizen. The specter of hyperparticipation by antidemocratic groups in interwar and postwar Europe led them to stress allegiance as a core virtue of a stable democracy. Participant orientations are a good thing. However, a civic culture requires that participant orientations be tempered by a strong dose of subject orientations. In fact, the focus on Germany in their study was implicitly to identify how the culture should be changed to produce public values more supportive of postwar German democracy.
She supports democracy, is satisfied with the democratic process, has confidence in institutions, and becomes engaged only where institutional mechanisms channel her activities toward orderly outcomes. There is limited room for political dissatisfaction, questioning authority, civil disobedience, or elite-challenging activity in The Civic Culture. In reaction to the student protests of the late s, this study examined the expanding use of elite-challenging political action, such as protests, boy- cotts, wildcat strikes, blockades, occupying buildings, and other contentious actions.
The Political Action study did not support this suspicion; protesters did not abstain from conven- tional forms of political participation, and they showed a strong attachment to democratic norms. For sure, protesters were disillusioned about some aspects of the democratic process. The — 70s protesters seemed to anticipate a new model of an assertive democratic citizen that contrasts with the allegiant model of The Civic Culture.
Ever since, political culture research has seen a latent tension between an allegiant and an assertive model of democratic citizenship. Recognizing these developments, Almond and Verba began to explore the dynamics of cultural change in The Civic Culture Revisited. They found that the best examples of the civic culture, the United States and Great Britain, had experienced a decline in allegiant, trustful orientations and a rise in challenging political values that was unexpected in the earlier Civic Culture volume.
It was not that Verba and I failed to appreciate structural variables. But we surely did not appreciate how quickly, and how steep the curves of change were going to be. The maintenance of these more traditional attitudes and their fusion with the participation orientation lead to a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values.
Inglehart linked the spread of elite-challenging action to the rise of postmaterialist values, which emphasize self-expression and direct participation in politics. Inspired by mod- ernization theory, he explained the emergence of postmaterialist values as the consequence of the rising existential security and cognitive mobilization that characterized the postwar generations in Western democracies. He held that social modernization would also give rise to postmaterialist values in nondemo- cratic regimes — which is potentially a powerful delegitimizing force against authoritarianism Inglehart The new type of self-expressive, postmaterialist political protester raised the suspicion of scholars who believed that the functioning of representative democracy requires the dominance of an allegiant citizen model Crozier et al.
Social capital was not only operationalized as trust in fellow citizens but also as trust in institutions, including the institutions of government — which is a key allegiant orientation. Indeed, further research showed that the processes linked to rising elite- challenging politics and postmaterialist values strained the principle of rep- resentative democracy.
For one, political and partisan competition added a cultural cleavage focused on lifestyle issues to the long-standing economic cleav- age centered on material redistribution. Furthermore, electoral participation, party identification, con- fidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with the democratic process were declining in most postindustrial democracies, while support for democ- racy as a political system and attachment to basic democratic norms remained stable or increased Dalton ; Norris The Civic Culture study and much of the early public opinion research typically focused on established Western democracies.
The practical reason was that representative mass surveys could not be conducted in the communist world and large parts of the developing world. This situation changed dramati- cally when consecutive waves of democratization opened the former communist bloc and large parts of the developing world to survey research. The first reports calculated the percentages of democracy supporters in a country or compared the balance of support for democracy against support for alternative regimes Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer ; Klingemann ; Mishler and Rose ; Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka This research yielded the surprising — and consistent — finding that support for democracy as a principle was widespread across established democracies, new democracies, and nondemocracies.
Scholars also started to differentiate different types of democratic support, such as intrinsic and instrumental support Bratton and Mattes ; Inglehart and Welzel , idealist and realist support Shin and Wells , or support that is coupled with dissatisfaction with the way democracy works: dissatisfied democrats or critical citizens Klingemann ; Norris These classifi- cations qualify democratic regime support for the motives and beliefs that lie behind it Schedler and Sarsfield Accordingly, they focus attention on the emergence of a new type of nonallegiant democrat and the implications for the development of democracy.
More recently, researchers have tried to disentangle what people in different parts of the world understand about the term democracy Dalton, Shin, and Jou ; Mattes and Bratton ; Diamond ; Chapter 4. Surprisingly as it may seem from the viewpoint of cultural relativism, there is a core liberal understanding of democracy among ordinary people around the world. Pronounced cultural differences exist, however, in the extent to which the liberal notion of democracy trumps alternative notions of democracy Welzel , — Yet, despite these differences in relative importance, freedom seems to have appeal across cultures.
Clearly this definition of development includes liberal democracy. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel further elaborate the idea of human development and integrate it into the political culture field also Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann In Freedom Rising, Welzel expands this approach to describe the growth of emancipative values among contem- porary publics.
He equates development with the empowerment of people to exert their freedoms. However, in the sequence of empowerment, democracy is the third component. For democracy only becomes effective after ordinary people have acquired the resources that make them capable to practice free- doms and after they have internalized the values that make them willing to practice freedoms.
In this view, participatory resources and values proliferate the material and motivational components of people power. They must be in place before democracy can be effectively practiced. Welzel identifies a set of orientations that are emancipative in their impetus because they merge libertar- ian and egalitarian orientations.
The prevalence of these emancipative values in a society is more closely linked with levels of democracy than any other citizen belief. The most important component of emancipative values in this respect has been found to be liberty aspirations — quite in line with the emphasis that liberal democracy places on freedom Welzel Some of the key contrasts between allegiant and assertive cultures are summarized in Table 1.
Changing orientations produce a gen- eral increase in postmaterialist and emancipative values as well as a shift in basic authority beliefs. These cultural changes manifest themselves in shifting attitudes toward political institutions, the practice of democracy, and even the definition of a good democracy and a good citizen. These political norms carry over to specific policy views that we also examine in this volume. For example, the traditional model of citizen included a strong priority for eco- nomic prosperity and little concern for environmental protection.
The new pattern of assertive citizenship heightens environmental concerns. Traditional norms gave limited attention on issues of racial and ethnic equality and sex- ual liberation; these issues receive strong support under the assertive model of citizenship. In summary, the debates over the role of political culture owe their inspira- tion to the initial groundwork laid by Almond and Verba in The Civic Culture and by Verba and Pye in Political Culture and Political Development.
Their research focused on an allegiant model of citizenship as essential to stable democracy, whereas the contours of an assertive model of citizenship became clear only recently. The content of a democratic political culture can be more complex than Almond and Verba and Pye initially envisioned, and the spread of democratic orientations differs markedly from earlier expectations of aver- age citizens.
The results, we believe, lead to both a reevaluation of the political. Political Culture and Value Change The guiding perspective of the value surveys is threefold. Another objective is to determine whether these cultural patterns relate to the institutional forms and the socioeconomic conditions of a society: Is there systematic evidence for a psychological dimension of development and democracy?
Another objective focuses on cultural change: Is there evidence for a transformation in human values, and are these changes operating in the same direction under the imprint of similar socioeconomic transformations? The latter point reflects a unique feature of the WVS. The EVS started with a first round in —83 and included more than a dozen European countries. This round expanded especially into the trans- forming ex-communist world. In many countries, like the former German Democratic Republic, the survey was done before the political transition was finalized, providing a valuable snapshot of public mood during the transition period.
The third round of the WVS spanned from to It included some fifty societies. The fourth round, from to , covered almost sixty societies. The fifth and most recent round of the WVS was conducted between and in some fifty societies. The fifth round also revised a con- siderable portion of the questionnaire: new questions developed by Christian Welzel to measure in-group and out-group trust, meanings of democracy, social identity, citizenship ideals, and media usage were added. The survey has included more than ninety societies that represent more than 90 percent of the world population.
Counting repeated surveys in the same nations, about country-by-year units are available. About sixty societies have been surveyed at least twice; for about forty-five societies, the WVS pro- vides longitudinal evidence of at least ten years. For another dozen societies, the time series covers the entire period from to , spanning fully twenty-five years. The WVS covers topics that are of inherent interest from the civic culture perspective: regime preferences, support for democracy, trust in institutions, social trust, law abidingness, political interest, media usage, voluntary activity, protest participation, authority orientations, liberty aspirations, social toler- ance and so on.
It is the only international survey that has such basic measures of human values across countries spanning all the regions of the globe. With this thematic breadth and its spatial and temporal scope, the WVS is clearly the ideal data source to examine the various facets of the civicness question outlined earlier. Hence, the chapters in this book are unified by both their interest in the civicness question and their usage of WVS data as a common source. The initial release of the sixth wave data was in April www. The experience shows that weighted results usually do not differ significantly.
Because the calibration weights provided with past official data releases are not documented equally well for all countries, it seems preferable not to use these weights in the type of large- scale cross-national analyses that the chapters of this volume perform. We have assembled a distinguished subset of these scholars to examine the topics of political culture, global value change, and democratic politics. The book is organized into three thematic sections. The first section concen- trates on the broad process of value change that fuels the transition from alle- giant to assertive citizenship.
Postmaterialist value change in Western democra- cies was the foundation for challenging the allegiant model of The Civic Culture and led to the broad theory of emancipatory cultural change. Thus, Paul R. Abramson first examines the postmaterialist trend in Western democracies. He tracks the evolution of postmaterialist values across generations spanning forty years of surveys.
He also shows how the generational patterns persist across the life cycle of consecutive birth cohorts. The results demonstrate that generational turnover has been a driving force in postmaterialist value change.
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Neil Nevitte uses the multiple waves of the WVS to track the decline of deferential orientations in various social domains. The traditional political culture model implies that deference to legitimate authority is a key element of an allegiant culture Almond and Verba , Chapters 9—12; Eckstein Thus, the erosion of deference is part of the transition toward a more assertive and elite-challenging citizenry.
The second section of this volume identifies some key features that describe the rise of an assertive citizenship. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin doc- ument the limited applicability of the allegiant model to citizens in established democracies and in developing nations. Support for a democratic regime is widespread across the globe, yet public skepticism of political institutions is also widespread.
It is especially striking in many established democracies that were once the bastion of allegiant citizens but now have politically skeptical publics. The authors offer evidence that contemporary democratization stimu- lates a more critical citizenry. Hans-Dieter Klingemann then focuses on the new category of dissatisfied democrats in European societies, describing their increase as a consequence of the changing values of contemporary publics.
He reflects on the implications of these new assertive citizens for our traditional models of a democratic political culture. Finally, Christian W. Haerpfer and Kseniya Kizilova describe patterns and change in political support in postcommunist Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia. They find a stronger presence of allegiant orientations in the countries with the largest deficiencies in democracy.
By contrast, the countries with the least democratic deficits show a stronger presence of assertive orientations — in line with the theme of this book. The third section of this book asks how changing values of contemporary publics are affecting more specific political attitudes and behaviors. Robert Rohrschneider, Matt Miles, and Mark Peffley study the relationship between social modernization, values, and environmental attitudes. They find that post- materialist values in developed societies connect current environmental atti- tudes in these nations to a broader criticism of modes of economic production.
The result is a more politicized environmental movement, even when environ- mental conditions are improving. Tor Georg Jakobsen and Ola Listhaug analyze the evolution of protest activ- ity from to Pippa Norris studies differences in gender attitudes between Muslim and non-Muslim states.
In contrast to those who argue that oil resources entrench the patriarchy of traditional societies, she argues that cultural values leave a deep imprint on the way people see the most appropriate roles for men and women in society — including the contemporary role of women in elected office.
This finding suggests that willingness to fight is in decline as well, indicating the erosion of allegiance in one of its core domains. The previ- ous chapters document the transition from an allegiant to an assertive type of democratic citizen. The conclusion then extends these micro-level analy- ses to examine the impact of political culture at the aggregate cross-national level. This analysis puts the central assumption of a culture-governance con- gruence to a direct test. Specifically, the chapter examines the relationship between allegiant and assertive values with governmental capacity and demo- cratic accountability.
It finds that allegiant values do not associate with either capacity or accountability, whereas assertive values display strong positive relationships with both. These results suggest that a new style of democratic.
In trying to look back at the failures of democracy in the past, it proscribed a model of citizen values that fit that history. The reader will see the evidence in the pages that follow. At the same time, the legacy of The Civic Culture is enduring. As Sidney Verba has recently written, the lasting impact of the Almond and Verba study is to create a fruitful field of political culture research in which others contribute and continue to expand the research crop.
Thus, we see this book as contributing to the bounty that The Civic Culture first sowed more than five decades ago. Four decades ago, Ronald Inglehart reported that younger Europeans held substantially different values than did their elders. Whereas older Euro- peans tended to value material security and domestic order, younger Europeans were more likely to value political liberties. This framework of value change subsequently had a major impact in reshaping our understanding of citizenship and political culture in advanced industrial democracies and is a foundation for the transition for allegiant to assertive values that is the pri- mary theme of this book.
He acknowledged that they might also result partly from the higher educational levels of the young. Even if economic conditions did not remain rosy after , it seemed highly unlikely that Europeans born after World War II would suffer the depri- vations experienced by those who grew up before or during the war or in its immediate aftermath.
And there were strong reasons to expect them to have higher levels of education than their prewar counterparts. If there has been a shift toward postmaterialism, it can have a major impact in transforming the politics and culture of advanced industrial societies. The growth of postmaterialism has eroded the traditional bases of party align- ments by contributing to a decline in class voting Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck ; Inglehart ; Lipset , a shift away from religious values Scar- borough , and a redefinition of the Left-Right continuum.
Dalton , 99— argued that the shift toward postmaterialism has five major conse- quences: It fuels demands for more flexible work environments; it leads to a declining deference toward authority; it leads to less restrictive attitudes toward sex-related issues; it leads to support for new social issues such as environmentalism and gender equality; and it stimulates direct political par- ticipation in decision making. There are substantial cross-sectional relationships to sup- port all five of the relationships Dalton postulated.
However, whereas we have data about postmaterialist values for thirty-six years, we do not have adequate data to examine the effects of replacement on most of these other value orientations. For the clearest statement of how these measures are constructed, including the SPSS syntax statements used to create them, see Inglehart , Value Change over a Third of a Century Some scholars have questioned the dimensionality of his basic measures, others have questioned their validity, and yet others have questioned whether Inglehart measures the most important dimensions of postwar attitude change.
In ear- lier work, I provide an extensive summary of these controversies Abramson This chapter discusses controversies about the impact of generational replacement and provides additional evidence about its impact. It summarizes some important insights by Dalton on the socialization process and then turns to the evidence published about the impact of replacement between and I then discuss W. Last, I present new evi- dence on the impact of replacement, examining value change between and He showed the relationship between age and val- ues in all seven countries, noting that it is highest in Germany, while it is low in Britain and actually negative in Belgium.
Using data on the gross domestic products GDPs of these countries beginning in , he modeled the impact of generation, education, life cycle, and income. He concluded that economic conditions at age ten are the most significant. One basic difference among these countries is that Denmark and the Netherlands were neutral during World War I, and in World War II, Denmark suffered a less draconian occupation than the other West European countries conquered by the Germans. Granted none of these countries suffered as badly as the countries Germany captured in the East, especially Poland and parts of the Soviet Union Mazower ; Snyder , but they had dramatically different experiences, with the Germans brutally treating Italians in German-occupied Italy after Italy surrendered to the Allies.
Only Britain avoided occupation. A better analysis would include the effects of war rather than GDP alone. Nonetheless, Dalton performs a clear analysis, and Raymond Duch and Michael Taylor , confirm his finding that the most important socialization experiences occur at about ten years of age. On one point Dalton was prescient.
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He correctly argued that the term revo- lution was too strong; furthermore, he argued Dalton , that support for postmaterialist values would grow at a slower rate than Inglehart predicted. As we see later, in the World Values Survey, there are virtually no dif- ferences in levels of postmaterialism among the four youngest cohorts in our weighted sample of the European public see Figure 2.
According to Inglehart , there was a substantial shift toward postmate- rialism in Britain and small shifts in West Germany, France, and the Nether- lands. In Italy, there was a substantial shift toward materialist values, and in Belgium, there was no change. Inglehart also presented data from the American National Election Studies surveys conducted in , , and Overall value scores were identical in and In retrospect, the shift toward postmaterialism in Britain was larger than his theory predicts, whereas the small shifts in Germany, France, and the Netherlands were about the order of magnitude that one might predict given the slow rates of generational replacement in modern industrial societies at least during periods of peace.
The net movement toward Post-Materialism that should have been expected from population replacement slowed to a crawl. In addition, Denmark, which along with Ireland had been added to the time series in , clearly showed a shift toward postmaterialism. Ireland failed to show any movement toward postmaterialism. Dalton updates his results through and shows a decline in postmaterialism among all cohorts between and In a personal commu- nication October 28, , Inglehart sent me the cohort results as well as overall PDI scores between and Overall levels of postmaterialism changed very little between and , although there was a slight decline in PDI scores among most cohorts.
Postmaterialists Minus Materials percentage 20 15 10 5 Total Sample 0 —5 —10 —15 —20 —25 —30 —35 —40 —45 —50 —55 — Percentage of postmaterialists minus materialists over time. Source: The results from —71 through are from surveys sponsored by the European Community. Christian Welzel. Citizen Politics.
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